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Our Knowledge of God: Essays on Natural and Philosophical Theology. Kelly
James Clark, editor. Dordrect: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992. Pp.
vi and 230. $99.00 (cloth).
MARK McLEOD, University of Texas at San Antonio

Our Knowledge of God, as a descriptive title for this somewhat disconnected
collection of essays, is in one way misleading. Only half the book's essays
deal with the rationality of belief in God, and only one directly with
knowledge of God. The remaining essays cover various aspects of God's
nature, eternal punishment, and theological methodology. Perhaps the
somewhat disparate connection of these essays reflects the fact that a
number of them derive from a conference held at Gordon College. Invited
papers are often open-ended with regard to their content.
On the other hand, the essays on the whole certainly add to our
knowledge of God and his attributes, or in some cases, add to how we
should approach the topic of God or belief in God. I shall comment on a
number of the essays, leaving the others to the reader.
Norman Kretzmann's, "Evidence Against Anti-Evidentialism" argues
that Plantinga's anti-evidentialism is not incompatible with evidentialism, unless the latter is construed in an unnatural and unhistorical way.
He further argues that evidentialism is not rooted in foundationalism
but, in fact, that the form is logically, psychologically, and probably functionally prior to foundationism. Kretzmann rightly notes that Plantinga
has narrowed the notion of evidence so as to exclude the kinds of
grounds that are not propositional. The goal of Plantinga's project, then,
is just to show that belief in God can be properly basic on grounds that
classical foundationalism traditionally has rejected. The most important
issue Kretzmann raises is the distinction between rationality as support of
a belief and rationality as the generation of a belief. He uses this to argue
that Planting a ignores the issue of occurent beliefs as grounds for the
belief in God. The upshot of Kretzmann's discussion is that "Plantinga's
project yields not so much theism without evidence as see-no-evidence
theism." (31) In this I think Kretzmann is right on the mark.
Alvin Plantinga's contribution, "Epistemic Probability and Evil,"
combines his earlier claims that belief in God is properly basic and that
evil is not a defeater for a belief in God, thus reemphasizing that there
are non propositional grounds for theistic belief. First Plantinga considers various accounts of probability and finds them wanting simply in
regard to being successful accounts of probability. But worse is the fact
that if any of these extant theories of probability is true, then "there
seems to be no way to develop an atheological probabilistic problem
from evil." (p. 50).
This essay is characteristically Plantinga and in some senses contains
little that is not present in his other essays. Nevertheless it does draw
out in a fuller fashion some important topics. The main one is that some
issues that appear to be neutral about religious or ontological matters
are ultimately not neutral about those concerns. I agree but on different
grounds. Plantinga rejects the claim that all evidence is propositional
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and he rejects coherence as sufficient for rationality. However, as I've
argued elsewhere, it's not clear that Plantinga's suggestions about proper basicality or warrant as proper function can really get away from a
holist position on rationality. In fact, that the starting point for epistemic
theories is largely an ontological issue plays into the holist's hand. Of
course theists may coherently reject the probabilistic argument from
evil. But that the theist may consistently do so does not show us which
ontological starting point is the correct one and that, it seems to me, is
the real issue.
Peter Forrest, in "Reference and the Refutation of Naturalism," argues
that "Naturalism fails when it comes to reference, and that the way it
fails provides some indirect support for the claim that human beings can
have a non-sentential, inarticulate knowledge of God, prior to reasoning." His argument is this. If Naturalism is true, then reference is grossly underdetermined but, since reference is not underdetermined,
Naturalism is false. His basic stand against the gross underdeterminahan of reference is that we have a piece of not essentially sentential
knowledge which we express by saying that we know what it is for a
class to be objectively natural. The naturalness here extends to far distant points of the universe-that is, what is a cow here is a cow anywhere. The "not essentially sentential knowledge" ultimately cannot be
accepted by Naturalists since for the Naturalist, all nontheoretical
knowledge is restricted to what can be observed. Gross underdetermination commits us to possibly many interpretations of a reference, e.g.,
cows as the animals observable in the field and bits of empty space 1 million miles from the field. Yet we rely on our claim that we know what it
is for a class to be objectively natural. Since many of the alternative references are not observable, reference cannot be grossly underdetermined. Naturalism, taken as a positive way of understanding the world
(and not merely skepticism), cannot give us an understanding of things
rather than merely beliefs, for reference ultimately fails to pick things
out. Forrest suggests, then, that we do have a non-sensory-like knowledge of natural kinds and that the acceptance of this knowledge opens
the door to the sensus divinitatus-a non-sensory-like means to the
knowledge of God.
This essay is an interesting argument for the possibility of knowing
God and for the rejection of Naturalism. It is strongest in its argument
against Naturalism. Nevertheless it is not clear why the Naturalist
should be upset over not explaining things rather than mere beliefs, so
long as beliefs can be explained in non-personal terms, which is precisely what the Naturalist thinks can be done. Put another way, does a
Naturalist have to be a realist? No. But why then take Naturalism to be
a positive explanation of things (reality?) rather than just one interpretation of the universe among many-which seems compatible with gross
undetermination? While I may not have done justice to Forrest's essay,
it seems that some of the big issues behind the debate between
Naturalism and Supernaturalism over reference and realism/ anti-realism need to be dealt with at greater length.
William P. Alston's, "The Place of Experience in the Grounds of
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Religious Belief" argues that putative experiences of God are (or can be)
shored up by other sources of justification so that "although each can be
questioned and none renders any of one's beliefs absolutely certain, they
lend support to each other as well as to the beliefs they are invoked to
support; so that in the way the whole assemblage fits together we have
sufficient reason to take the beliefs to be true" (p. 110). This position,
and the essay in which it is explained, naturally extend the position on
religious experience that Alston has developed over the past two
decades. I have only one issue to raise, which I discuss elsewhere at
greater length. Does Alston's moderate foundationalism give enough of
a place to coherentist considerations in the "interpretation" of theistic
experience? I believe notl.
In "Revelation" Richard Swinburne examines whether we have reason to expect a revelation of propositional truth about God, what such a
revelation would be like, and what kind of historical evidence would
show that we have got it. Given non-revealed evidence for God's existence, says Swinburne, one should expect a revelation from God about
various things, including how humans can move into sainthood. Such a
revelation could not be, for logical as well as empirical reasons, culturefree or presuppositionless. Instead, such a revelation would be culturally rooted but God would also provide a means of guidance for extracting the truth out of this culturally rooted revelation. Furthermore, we
can evaluate the revelation by two tests. First, does it cohere with our
overall philosophical and moral view? Second, is it attended by some
supernatural events-the miraculous?
Swinburne's argument turns, it seems to me, on a controversial issue.
He argues that it is plausible to believe that there is only one atonement
sufficing for the whole human race. "So any revelation of that atonement must have enough connection with the century and culture in
which it took place for the report of it to be comprehensible. And that
means that there cannot be totally separate revelations for different centuries and cultures. Or at least [this is] an argument for one final (his
emphasis) major revelation, reporting that atonement." (p.119) What
hangs on this is the claim that there is one (final) Christian revelation.
But I don't see how Swinburne's argument works. One would think, on
Swinburne's a priori grounds, that God would reveal the atonement to
each and every culture and century-just the reverse of what Swinburne
claims.
Nicholas Wolterstorffs "Divine Simplicity" argues that in order to
understand the medieval doctrine of God's simplicity we must imaginatively enter into the medieval's ontological style--constituent ontology
rather than our relational ontology. For the medieval "everything is a
nature" rather than our "everything has a nature." God is simple, then,
in not being complex. God is not accidental. The upshot of this, says
Wolterstorff, is that our puzzlement about certain identity claims the
medievals made about God (e.g., God's existence is not distinct from his
essence) disappears. What we should concentrate on is not the doctrine
of simplicity but rather the issues arising from the medieval's ontological style. I have only one question here. Is this just a matter of style? Or
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perhaps better, what has Wolterstorff in mind when he talks about style?
The difference between a constituent and a relational ontology seems to
involve more than a difference in style.
Kelly James Clark adds his "Hold Not Thy Peace at My Tears" to the
collection. This essay is a reflection on theological methodology in
which Clark argues that there is an impasse between two accounts of
God's relationship to suffering. First, there is divine impassibility which
rests on tradition, a Platonizing metaphysics and Scripture. Second
there is a dynamic view which rests on religious experience, intuitions,
feminine understandings of the divine, socio-political reflection and
Scripture. Clark's thesis is that inference to the best explanation is a way
out of the impasse, and he comes down on the side of dynamism-even
though this raises important and deep issues about divine ontology.
While I believe Clark is right in his suggestion here-inference to the
best explanation is the most plausible way to settle these differencesI'm not entirely sanguine. I have two concerns. First, running through
this essay is the goal of discussing theological method and yet it is
focused on one issue alone. That issue is, of course, an important one,
but the suggested solution to the impasse leaves open other ontological
questions. Won't these in turn need a theological methodology to sort
out the issues? Won't we perhaps be back to square one? And second,
while inference to the best explanation may be useful where theological
conflict arises, is it the method we should use in less controversial areas
of theological research?
Marilyn McCord Adams' contribution "Julian of Norwich on The
Tender Loving Care of Mother Jesus" argues that God leaves us in certain kinds of ignorance and that these are acceptable given the right
views of child-development. We are, in ways, like children. In her
insightful way, McCord Adams leads us to think in pastoral but philosophically deep ways about God's care.
Her emphasis, following Julian, on sin as shame and incompetence is
very helpful and I think it would serve the Christian community well if
more philosophers would explore the nature of sin. The relationship
between sin and ignorance in particular is one needing explanation. It
was, after all, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.
George N. Schlesinger, in "The Scope of Human Autonomy" argues
that perhaps human freedom should be seen as a basis for eternal life in
that freedom is so important that its consequences are eternal. As such,
humans may not face punishment for past sin but rather have the
amount of heavenly virtue attained to be up to us. Alternatively, there
may be punishment but it, and its attendant difficulties, are justified by
the greatly enhanced role of human autonomy.
Schlesinger's thoughts here are attractive for a number of reasons.
First, his emphasis on freedom leaves open a faithfulness to the main
traditions in Christianity with regard to eternal punishment while also
providing some account which ameliorates the horror of that tradition.
Second, and more important, is the openness to the future and to future
development implied in his suggestions. As a child I worried that heaven might be terribly dull-after all, we would all have the same goals
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and purposes. But perhaps in our full autonomy, we will develop and
grow even more in the afterlife than we could ever possibly do in the
mundane.
Our Knowledge of God is a collection of good essays, but it is not a good
collection of essays. One would enjoy a collection with more thematic
unity and a few less typographical errors. Nevertheless, the essays are,
by and large, well worth the read.
NOTES
1.

See my Rationality and Theistic Belief.

Faith in Theory and Practice: Essays on Justifying Religious Belief. Elizabeth S.

Radcliffe and Carol J. White, editors. Chicago and LaSalle, IL: Open
Court Publishing Co., 1993. Pp. xix and 235. $34.95 (cloth; $16.95 (paper).
LAURA GARCIA, Rutgers University.
This collection derives from a 1991 conference held at Santa Clara
University on the topic of the epistemology of religious belief. The editors provide a helpful introduction with a brief description of each essay
and an explication of the principle of unity they find running throughout the book: "Faith can be seen as not just a set of beliefs but a special
way of living." This book would make an interesting text in an upperlevel undergraduate or graduate course in the philosophy of religion. It
touches on many of the issues which are at the cutting edge of discussion on the justification of religious belief, and moves that discussion
forward in fresh and fascinating ways.
The lead essays by William Alston and Alvin Plantinga are especially
intriguing, and the collection is worth having for these alone. In "The
Fulfillment of Promises as Evidence for Religious Belief," Alston argues
that, within a kind of cumulative-case apologetics for Christianity, "the
fulfillment of (alleged) divine promises of spiritual development by a
large number of persons provides us with a significant reason for
accepting the Christian belief system that involves the claim that such
promises have been made" (p. 7). According to Christian teaching, God
promises to reward those who are open, receptive, and obedient to him
with growth in holiness, or what Alston sometimes calls "spirituality" or
"sanctity." Alston concludes that the phenomenon of fulfilled promises
is widespread enough that "it raises the probability of the system [of
Christianity] sufficiently to be worthy of notice"(p. 12). Alston's case is
perhaps strongest when the focus is on lives of the saints, since the spiritual qualities of the saints are difficult to explain in purely natural psychological terms. Many converts have reported that it was the character
of the Christians in their acquaintance that was most decisive in their
coming to faith, and one can see Alston's essay as making this move
epistemically respectable.

